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Abstract 
 
 
 The practical realizations of BB84 quantum key distribution protocol using 
single-photon or weak coherent states have normally presented low efficiency, in the 
meaning that most bits sent by Alice are not useful for the final key. In this work, we 
show an optical setup to improve the transmission rate of useful bits putting together two 
ideas, parallel quantum key distribution and physical encryption using mesoscopic 
coherent states. The final result is a four time faster quantum key distribution setup.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique based on quantum mechanics 
laws that permits two users of an authenticated channel to share, in a secure way, a 
random bit sequence used as key in cryptography algorithms. Due to the importance of 
confidentiality of the information trafficking in optical networks, QKD setups were 
rapidly implemented using light polarization [1-4], single-photon interference [5-9] and 
entangled pair of photons [10-12]. Currently, the single-photon interference setups are the 
most used, although the setups using polarization of single-photons have been proposed 
for fast (GHz clocked) and short distance QKD [13,14]. However, all the implemented 
QKD setups have presented low efficiency, in the meaning that most of the bits sent by 
the transmitter will not be used in the final key. This happens due to physical and logical 
reasons. The physical reasons are the losses in the optical fiber and optical devices, large 
number of empty pulses (vacuum states) when weak coherent states are used and low 
efficiency of single-photon detectors. The logical reason is the fact that QKD protocols 
require that only the bits in the time slots that transmitter and receiver have chosen the 
same bases be kept to form the key. Hence, at least 50% of the bits sent by the transmitter 
are lost, being the lower bond of 50% reached only for an ideal QKD setup.  
Between the optical setups for QKD already proposed, a very interesting is one 
that uses single-photon interference in sidebands of phase or amplitude modulated light 
[15-19]. Recently it was shown that such system has a generalization that could, at least 
in principle, to permit to run two or more QKD protocols in parallel [20]. If two QKD 
protocols are run in parallel, then the transmission rate of useful bits can be doubled.  
On the other hand, aiming to escape of the slow optical schemes based on single-
photon sources and detectors, fast quantum communication setups using mesoscopic 
coherent states (QCMC) have been proposed [21-24]. Such system is based on the 
polarization of coherent states and it permits to reach gigabits rates in long distance 
optical networks. The security of the QCMC has been discussed in the literature [25-30] 
and, from our point of view based on the arguments used in favor and contrary, the 
system is secure for direct physical encryption but it is not secure for quantum key 
generation due to the use of a pseudo-random number generator. However, in order to 
circumvent this problem, recently it was proposed to use physical encryption and single-
photon-based QKD together [31]. We call this system hybrid QKD because it uses weak 
(or single-photon) and mesoscopic coherent states. In this case, the data, randomly 
generated by Alice, are encrypted in the polarization of mesoscopic coherent states and 
are used to guide Bob in the choice of the bases used by him in a common QKD setup 
using weak coherent states. In this way, Alice and Bob choose always the same bases and 
none bit is lost in the sifting stage. This obviously doubles the useful bit transmission 
rate.  
In this work we present a protocol for hybrid parallel QKD. In other words, we 
show how to implement two QKD protocols in parallel using single-photon interference 
in sidebands and physical encryption with mesoscopic coherent states. Such system has 
the transmission rate of useful bits four times larger than traditional QKD setup using 
single-photon interference in sidebands. This work is outlined as follows: in Section 2, 
the parallel QKD is proposed; In Section 3, physical encryption and hybrid QKD protocol 
are explained; In Section 4 the protocol for hybrid parallel QKD is presented and, at last, 
the conclusion are in Section 5.  
  
2. Parallel QKD Protocol 
 
The QKD setups using single-photon interference in sidebands can be constructed 
having phase modulators in Alice and Bob (PM-PM), amplitude modulators in Alice and 
Bob (AM-AM) or still amplitude (phase) modulator in Alice and phase (amplitude) 
modulator in Bob (AM-PM/PM-AM) [32]. Differently of [20], our parallel QKD system 
is of AM/PM type. The amplitude modulator used by Alice is a Mach-Zehnder (MZ) 
modulator. The proposed system can be seen in Fig. 1. 
  
The electric field at MZA output is given by 
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where 1 is due to the DC polarization of the MZ modulator, m1(2) and 1(2)  are, 
respectively, the modulation depth and the radiofrequency for channels 1 and 2. 
Moreover, 	1A and 	2A are the phase shifts of the radiofrequencies 1 and 2 and they 
carry Alice’s information. Having m1(2) << 1, (1) can be simplified to   
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The field intensity can be calculated from (2), giving 
 
    
2
0
1 1 1 1 1A 2 1 2 2A1 cos sin cos sin cos .2A
EI m t m t      	    	  
 
Choosing 1 3 2  , and substituting this value in (2) or (3), the following electric field 
is obtained.  
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In (4) the global phase depending on 1,2 and 	1A,2A was not considered. After 
propagation in an optical fiber link with length L, the electric field at Bob’s phase 
modulator input is 
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where 0 1(2) 1(2),   e    
  are the propagation constants for each frequency component of 
EF: 0, 0+1, 0-1, 0+2, 0-2. Despising chromatic dispersion, 1(2)

 are given by 
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Substituting (6) in (5) and taking off the global phase 0j Le  , (5) can rewritten as  
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Now, after Bob’s phase modulator the electric field is 
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In (8) m3(4) are, respectively, the modulation depths used by Bob for the channels 1 and 2. 
Moreover, 	1B and 	2B are the phases of the radiofrequencies 1 and 2, respectively, 
chosen by Bob according to QKD protocol. Considering m3(4) << 1, (8) can be 
approximated by 
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Substituting (7) in (9) one finds 
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Finally, the intensities of the sidebands for each modulating frequency 1(2)  can be 
calculated from (10). The results are 
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where $	1=	1A-	1B and $	2=	2A-	2B. Observing (11) and (12), one can see that 
interference occurs independently for each channel. Furthermore, if (n/c)1L=/2, 
(n/c)2L=3/2, m1=2m3 and m2=2m4, (11) and (12) are of the form   
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Hence, using the system of Fig. 1, one can run two BB84 protocols in parallel, one in 
channel 1 and the other in channel 2, doubling the transmission rate of useful bits.  
 
3. Physical Encryption and Hybrid QKD Protocol 
 
The unconditional security of QCMC is still an opened question [25-30]. From 
our point of view, QCMC is not secure for QKD but it is secure for direct physical 
encryption. This mean that Alice can send a secret message to Bob and an eavesdropper 
will not be able to read it correctly, but such message cannot be used as key in a 
cryptography algorithm. In order to go a little deeper in the security analysis, let us 
consider the brute-force attack in the QCMC using linear polarization of two-mode 
coherent states. Firstly, any two-mode coherent state having linear polarization can 
constructed applying a polarization rotation in the horizontal state %&,0' 
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where ˆVa  and ˆHa  are, respectively, the annihilation operators of the vertical and 
horizontal modes. For this linearly polarised light, the mean values and the variances of 
the Stokes parameters are known to be )S1'=%&%2cos(2(), )S2'=%&%2sin(2(), )S3'=0 and  
(15) 
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S S SV V V &   . Hence, the uncertainty in the polarization depends directly on the 
intensity of the optical field. A related question is how good one can distinguish between 
two linear polarisation states having a dephasing of ( between them. This measure is 
given by the inner product and, without loss of generality, let us consider one of the 
polarisations to be the linear horizontal state. The inner product is then given by: 
 
     2 2 2,0 ,0 exp 2 sinD R& ( & & (   . 
 
Hence, the smaller (toward zero) the angle ( the larger the necessary mean photon 
number of the coherent state for a good distinguishability. This point is crucial for the 
security of the quantum communication protocols based on mesoscopic coherent states, 
since it states that some relation between the mean photon number and the number of 
bases used must be obeyed in order to guarantee the security of the protocol. This fact 
can be well understood analysing the brute force attack. Let us suppose that Alice 
chooses randomly (with equal probability) a linearly polarized two-mode coherent state 
from the set {%(0',...,%(2M-1'}, 0*(*, hence, there are M bases. The goal of Eve is to 
identify the polarization sent by Alice. If the pulse has too many photons, Eve can apply 
the brute force attack, that is, she divide the pulse sent by Alice in M other pulses with the 
same polarization. For the Pi (i=0...M-1) pulse, Eve applies the polarization rotation of -
+i, 0*+*/2, and passes it through a polarization beam splitter (PBS) having single-
photon counters at both PBS outputs. The optical setup is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
If Eve has perfect detectors (unitary efficiency and noiseless), the following cases are 
possible: 
 
1) Detection in both detectors: In this case Eve knows the polarization rotation is wrong.  
2) None detection in both detectors: In this case Eve does not gain any information. 
3) Detection in only one detector: In this case there are two possibilities; Eve used the 
correct polarization rotation or Eve used a wrong polarization rotation but there was no 
photon in one of the PBS output.  
 
Hence, if the optical pulse has a number of photons much larger than M, with high 
probability Eve will get the right polarization. On the other hand, if the number of 
photons of the pulse is lower than M, then Eve will not have enough photons to test all 
possible polarization rotations and she will not be able to determine, with good precision, 
the linear polarization sent by Eve. Hence, in order to implement a secure quantum 
communication system where the bits are coded in the polarization the condition %&%2<<M 
must be satisfied. Now, one can argue that Eve can use an optical amplifier in order to 
have %&%2>>M. However, an optical amplifier will, unavoidably, to produce unpolarized 
photons due to generation and amplification of spontaneous emissions (ASE). These 
upolarized photons will cause mistakes in Eve’s detection and, once in Bob, they will 
cause counts in the detector that he was not expecting to receive any photon, since in the 
QCMC Bob knows in advance the polarizations used by Alice.  
The hybrid QKD protocol is described as follow: 
 
1. Alice and Bob share in advance a secret key K having %K% bits. Using this 
key as seed in a pseudo-random number generator, a new expanded key K’ 
having %K’% bits is created.  
 
2. Alice generates a true random sequence of bits R having %R% = %K’%/log2(M) 
(o means the first integer lower than ‘o’) bits. Thus, for each bit of R, Alice 
uses log2(M) bits of K’, that has a decimal representation DK, to choose the 
basis of polarization to be used. Further, if DK is an even number and the bit 
value of R is ‘0’, then the polarization in the first quadrant is used (</2). If 
bit value of R is ‘1’, then the polarization in the second quadrant is used 
(>/2). On the other hand, if DK is an odd number and the bit value of R is ‘0’, 
then the polarization in the second quadrant is used (>/2). If bit value of R is 
‘1’, then the polarization in the first quadrant is used (</2). Obeying the just 
described codification, Alice sends linearly polarized optical pulses to Bob. 
The mean photon number of the pulses sent by Alice are much lower than M.  
 
3. Since Bob knows the expanded key K’, he will always measure the optical 
pulse sent by Alice in the correct polarization basis and he will know which 
polarizations mean bit ‘0’ and ‘1’. Hence, Bob will obtain the correct bit 
sequence R sent by Alice with high probability.  
 
4. The BB84 protocol is realized with Alice and Bob using the bits of R to 
choose the bases.   
There are two clear advantages in this hybrid QKD protocol. Firstly, the sifting 
stage does not exist anymore, since Alice and Bob always choose the same bases. 
Obviously, this doubles the transmission rate of useful bits. Secondly, at the photon 
number splitting attack (PNS) [33,34], Eve keeps one photon and sends the rest of the 
pulse to Bob. She maintains her photon in a quantum memory waiting Alice and Bob 
divulgate publicly the bases used. However, using the hybrid QKD protocol, Alice and 
Bob will not divulgate the basis used anymore. Hence, quantum memory will be useless 
for Alice and the PNS will be harder because Eve will need pulses having at least three 
photons. Then, the best that Eve can do is to attack the mesoscopic coherent states but, as 
explained above and in the references [25,26,28,31], she will not have success. Moreover, 
Bob can monitor the optical power of the mesoscopic pulses and not expected detections 
in his detectors in order to infer if Eve applied an attack using a beam-splitter or beam 
splitter/optical amplifier attack. Obviously, this is possible if there are not optical 
amplifiers in the link between Alice and Bob, otherwise Bob will not know if the 
unpolarized photons are due to Eve’s attack or in line amplifiers. An example of hybrid 
QKD implementation can be seen in Fig. 3. It is a polarimetric BB84 protocol.  
 
In Fig. 3, EOS is an electro-optic switch and HWP is a half wave plate. As can be 
seen in Fig. 3, the 1300 nm channel is used for QCMC employing passive linear optical 
error correction [35,36], while the 850 nm channel is used for fast and short distance 
polarimetric QKD.  
 
 
4. Hybrid Parallel QKD Protocol 
 
The construction of a hybrid parallel QKD protocol is, now, straightforward. 
Alice and Bob have a QKD setup as shown in Fig. 1 and a QCMC setup as shown in the 
1300 nm channel of Fig. 3. The protocol is exactly as explained in steps 1-4 of Section 3. 
In the fourth step, Alice and Bob use bit sequence R to choose the bases for both QKD 
systems, channel 1 (radiofrequency 1) and channel 2 (radiofrequency 2). Since each 
QKD system will double its transmission rate of useful bits and there are two QKD 
systems working in parallel, if the final key is composed by concatenation of both 
individual keys, the total transmission rate of useful bits will be four time larger than a 
traditional BB84 QKD. The optical setup for hybrid parallel QKD can be seen in Fig. 4.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 Firstly, we have shown that it is possible to implement parallel QKD using single-
photon interference in sidebands with two carriers, employing amplitude modulator in 
Alice and phase modulator in Bob. Following, we showed how to construct a hybrid 
QKD protocol. The security against brute force attack was discussed and an optical setup 
was presented. At last, we put everything together, showing how to implement hybrid 
parallel QKD having transmission rate of useful bits four times larger than traditional 
weak coherent state-based QKD.     
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Figure 1: Optical setup for parallel QKD using two carriers. 
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Figure 2: Linear polarization identification using brute force. 
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, 0
HV
&
 A AR (
 4R 
 B BR (
2+ 
1300 nm- 
850 nm- 
+
 
Figure 3: Polarimetric hybrid QKD optical setup. 
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Figure 4: Optical setup for hybrid parallel QKD. 
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